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Abstract 
Entrepreneurial Business Models in the German Software Industry: Companies, 
Venture Capital, and Stock Market Based Growth Strategies on the ‘Neuer Markt’ 
by Lutz Engelhardt* 
Young, radically innovative, growth oriented, and publicly listed high-tech companies in 
Silicon Valley together with venture capital financiers gave birth to the concept of the 
‘Entrepreneurial Business Model’ (EBM). This concept has become central to the debate 
about the innovative capacity of nations in information technology and its promotion became 
an important policy objective in Germany during the 1990s. This paper addresses the question 
of whether German software companies on the former ‘Neuer Markt’ of the Frankfurt stock 
exchange were able to successfully implement business models similar to that of the typical 
entrepreneurial company in the United States. The paper focuses on the performance of 
software companies and venture capital investments on the ‘Neuer Markt’. A number of 
findings emerge from this effort. First, successful German software companies implement 
traditional business models. The most successful German software companies specialize in 
IT- and software services. Such firms do not specialize in standardized software products 
which require little service and customization. Second, German venture capital for the most 
part was not able to establish successful entrepreneurial companies on the Silicon Valley 
model. Nor were they able to create a successful German variant of venture capital 
involvement in more traditional companies. 
Keywords: Venture Capital, Software, Stock Markets, Germany, Entrepreneurial Business 
Models 
JEL Classification: L86, G30 
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Zusammenfassung 
Entrepreneurial Business Models in der deutschen Softwareindustrie: Unternehmen, 
Wagniskapital und Aktienmarkt gestützte Wachstumsmodelle am ‚Neuen Markt’ 
Junge, radikal innovative, schnell wachsende und börsennotierte Hightech-Unternehmen aus 
dem Silicon Valley und ihre Risikokapitalgeber standen Pate für den Begriff des 
‚Entrepreneurial Business Model’ (‚Unternehmerisches Geschäftsmodell’/ 
Wachstumsunternehmen). In den Diskussionen um die Innovationskraft einer Volkswirtschaft 
nimmt dieses Konzept eine prominente Stellung ein und wurde so zu einem der Hauptziele 
deutscher Wirtschaftförderung in den 90er Jahren. In diesem Beitrag wird der Frage 
nachgegangen, ob deutsche Softwareunternehmen des ‚Neuen Marktes’ der Frankfurter Börse 
in der Lage waren, Geschäftsmodelle ähnlich dem des typischen amerikanischen 
Wachstumsunternehmen zu etablieren. Zu diesem Zweck wird die wirtschaftliche Leistung 
von Softwareunternehmen und Wagniskapitalinvestments am ‚Neuen Markt’ analysiert. Es 
zeigt sich zum ersten, dass die erfolgreichsten deutschen Softwareunternehmen keine 
klassischen Wachstumsunternehmen im amerikanischen Sinne sind, sondern traditionell 
wirtschaften. Die stärksten deutschen Softwareunternehmen haben sich auf serviceintensive 
IT- oder Softwareservices spezialisiert. Unternehmen, die standardisierte Software mit 
geringem Service- oder Personalisierungsanteil anbieten schneiden vergleichsweise schlecht 
ab. Es stellt sich zweitens heraus, dass deutsche Wagniskapitalgeber in ihrer Mehrheit nicht 
dazu in der Lage waren, starke Wachstumsunternehmen an den Markt zu bringen oder eine 
erfolgreiche deutsche Variante des Wagniskapitalinvestments in traditionellere Unternehmen 
zu entwickeln. 
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Introduction 
 
In the course of the 90s, the public debate about German competitiveness became dominated 
by concerns about national innovative capacity. Around that time, the development of new 
technologies lowered investment costs far enough to enable relatively small, young 
companies to outpace incumbent companies in the development of innovative products. This 
was especially true in the case of biotechnology, microelectronics and software. While the 
origins of this development can be found in the United States in the late 70s – in the case of 
software even earlier – it took approximately 25 years for this phenomenon to be regarded as 
a central defining characteristic of the national system of innovation in the United States. 
Based on the example of successful high-tech start-ups in the Silicon Valley, the term 
‘Entrepreneurial Business Model’ (EBM) was coined.1 It denotes the organization, production 
and financing strategies implemented by the typical young, radically innovative, fast growing, 
and publicly listed company that came to dominate the information technology sectors in the 
United States. 
Entrepreneurial companies (i.e. companies implementing an EBM), their contribution to 
innovation and growth, and their main structural prerequisites – such as special stock market 
segments for fast-growing companies ('growth segments') and venture capital (VC) – are 
some of the focal points in the debate about long-term German competitiveness (Pfirrman, 
Wupperfeld et al. 1997). During the 60s and 70s the lag of Germany in information 
technology was attributed to unfavorable industrial and trade policies designed to protect a 
few national champions (Bresnahan and Malerba 1999). However, during the 80s and 90s a 
lack of risk-tolerant, collateral-free equity finance for many SMEs and start-ups was identified 
as a particularly large impediment to a developed information technology sector. The high 
reliance on risk-averse debt capital in Germany is presumed to block product innovation in 
both new and incumbent companies (Lienhard von Zofingen 1987). VC combined with 
growth segments on stock markets is widely regarded to be the only viable source of working 
capital for companies in risky but potentially lucrative high technology fields (Gompers and 
Lerner 1996; Vitols 2001). Consequently there were a number of attempts to encourage the 
formation of entrepreneurial companies in Germany by constructing a supportive financial 
and institutional infrastructure. These attempts include the creation of a state funded German 
                                                 
1 Frequently used synonymous terms are ‘Silicon Valley’ company, high-tech startup, new technology based 
firm (NTBF) or entrepreneurial company. 
VC company WFG (German Corporation for Venture Capital) at the beginning of the 80s, 
and the establishment of a stock market segment ‘Geregelter Freiverkehr’ at the end of the 
80s, which was designed for companies that could not meet the strict admission requirements 
of the main market in Frankfurt (Stedler 1987; Wrede 1987; Klemm 1988). These attempts 
were largely unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the government continued to try to support the 
building up of venture capital capacity in Germany. The federal program BJTU (Participation 
Program for Young Technology-Based Firms) and its successor program BTU (Participation 
Program for Technology-Based Firms) in particular have directed considerable funding into 
different German VC projects throughout the 90s (Kulicke and Wupperfeld 1996). In the late-
90s more VC was available to German companies than at any previous point in history.  
However, it was not until the creation of the ‘Neuer Markt’ as a dedicated growth segment of 
the Frankfurt stock exchange in 1997 that a larger number of relatively young companies 
went public in Germany, thereby creating a viable exit channel for German VC to cash in on 
investments. The ‘Neuer Markt’ was another attempt to create a receptive stock market for 
VC and entrepreneurial companies (Plückelmann 2000). The ‘Neuer Markt’ initially was 
promising, with hundreds of IPOs and lively VC participation. In the late 1990s it was easier 
to acquire VC in Germany than in the USA (Mackewicz&Partner 2000). But the investment 
frenzy that came to an abrupt end with the burst of the stock market bubble in mid-2000 was a 
disastrous experience for many private investors. A number of companies traded on this 
segment had poorly conceived business models which could not realize the high expectations 
they created. Even though the ‘Neuer Markt’ was discontinued in 2003, a large number of 
companies listed on the ‘Neuer Markt’ are still traded at the Frankfurt stock exchange on two 
new segments – the Prime and the General Standard. Many of those companies are either 
doing relatively well or are gradually recovering from the economic downturn three years 
ago. Germany’s most sensational experimentation with Anglo-Saxon style EBMs clearly left 
its mark – over 350 companies went public during the 6 years (03.10.97 – 06.05.03) the 
‘Neuer Markt’ existed. 
This paper addresses the question of whether the creation of the ‘Neuer Markt’ and the 
investment activity of venture capital had a positive effect on the development of 
entrepreneurial companies in a German setting. This effect is measured in terms of company 
financial performance. The software sector was chosen because software is one of the sectors 
in which EBMs are most prevalent (Landau and Rosenberg 1986). Therefore, the paper 
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reviews post-IPO2 growth in sales and productivity as well as the general performance of the 
software companies which went public on the ‘Neuer Markt’ between 1997 and 2001. In 
addition, the role of VC for the development of those companies is assessed. Thus, the paper 
contributes to the discussion of the potential for success of EBMs in a German context, and of 
VC as a necessary precondition for this success.  
The paper proceeds in three steps. First, the theoretical benefits of growth segments and VC 
for the evolution of software companies are described and the part they play in the concept of 
EBMs is laid out. The importance of growth segments and VC for the German problem of 
innovation bottlenecks is discussed. Second, the paper describes the performance as well as 
the structural features of the software companies on the ‘Neuer Markt’. Here the paper deals 
with the question of the extent to which these companies have implemented EBMs. Based on 
the empirical evidence, it is demonstrated that there are examples of entrepreneurial 
companies on the ‘Neuer Markt’, but that they are for the most part unsuccessful. Instead, the 
most successful companies on the ‘Neuer Markt’ implement traditional business models. 
Accordingly, the connection between VC participation and company performance is analyzed. 
The key question here is if VC in Germany was able to bring especially fast growing and 
technologically advanced companies to the ‘Neuer Markt’. It is shown that the presence of 
VC had no significant positive influence on the performance of companies. For the most part 
it was neither able to promote the implementation of EBMs at the ‘Neuer Markt’ nor to 
succeed in defining a German version of VC strategy. Finally, this paper comes to the 
conclusion that the existence of a stock market with an active growth segment and the general 
availability of VC are not sufficient preconditions for the successful emulation of Silicon 
Valley in Germany. German VC, at least in the history of the software companies on the 
‘Neuer Markt’, lacks specific investment strengths in comparison with the Anglo-Saxon 
archetype. 
                                                 
2 An initial public offering (IPO) is a company’s first offer to sell stock to the public. 
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Entrepreneurial Business Models, Venture Capital, and Stock Markets 
 
Entrepreneurial Business Models in the Software Sector 
There is no generally accepted definition of EBMs. However, the term usually denotes 
business models of new companies which are founded to market highly innovative products 
or services. EBMs are usually associated with American success in high technology sectors – 
namely software, electronics, and biotechnology. The typical company following an EBM 
was founded by one or more entrepreneurs to develop a specific product in a market where 
extraordinarily rapid sales growth can be achieved. The company is usually incorporated with 
the participation of VC. The start-up company’s goal is to grow fast enough to obtain a listing 
on a stock market before the financial resources provided by the VCs are exhausted. This kind 
of company’s fixation on growth and new products makes them relatively risky investments.3 
An alternative, traditional type of company grows much more slowly, is solely reliant on debt 
finance or internal revenues for company finance, and is a less risky investment overall. The 
primary goal of this kind of company is sustainable business development rather than fast 
growth.  
Patterns of corporate governance differ considerably between the two groups. The 
entrepreneurial company is subjected to diligent control efforts of the investor community, 
first by the venture capitalists and after its IPO by market actors. The traditional company 
provides its creditors with collateral and stays relatively closed to the outside world. Usually, 
the influence of investors, who do not for example take part in active management, is less 
pronounced than in the case of an entrepreneurial company. While the first type of company 
is normally associated with the way business is done in high-tech sectors in Anglo-Saxon 
countries (in particular in Silicon Valley), the second is regarded as typical for the German 
Mittelstand company (Vitols 2001).  
                                                 
3 The implementation of an EBM does not necessarily imply new corporate empires in the tradition of Apple, 
Microsoft or Oracle. However, entrepreneurial companies represent a mode of radical technological innovation 
that is widely regarded, in high technology sectors at least, as individually and collectively superior to the in-
house research and development activities of established companies. Within this mode of company development, 
existing companies innovate and grow via acquisitions. The paradigmatic example of 'innovation by acquisition’ 
used to be the network hardware producer Cisco Systems in the late 90s. This paper ignores companies 
belonging to this group. Instead, it concentrates on the independent and publicly traded software companies 
which are listed on the Prime and General Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and went public at the 
'Neuer Markt' during the four year period between 1997 and 2001. Public availability of data is the one of the 
main advantages of studying publicly listed companies as opposed to private companies. 
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Due to structural peculiarities of the software business, EBMs are widely regarded as 
indispensable for the creation of a truly successful software company. First, because of two 
distinct features of software products – increasing returns and network effects – rapid growth 
and early domination of its market segment is regarded as especially important for the long 
term success of a software company. Second, the importance of rapid sales growth and the 
fact that a major share of investment is used for the creation of intellectual property that is 
generally not accepted as loan collateral (lines of code in the case of software) makes it 
difficult for entrepreneurial companies to get bank loans. Therefore it is a particularly 
important competitive advantage to be able to get external equity finance in the software 
sector. The next two sections concentrate on the impact of increasing returns and network 
effects on the one hand and the importance of equity finance on the other. 
 
Increasing Returns and Network Effects 
Due to the impact of network effects and increasing returns one would expect the successful 
entrepreneurial software company to have a specific type of strategic orientation, 
organizational form, and economic performance. In principle the company should sell a 
product as standardized as possible to avoid the classical pitfall of decreasing marginal 
returns. Once the up-front investment for product development is incurred, the business model 
"scales up" (i.e. increases sales) without much additional cost. This is a result of the negligible 
production cost of additional copies of the company’s software. With every extra unit sold 
returns increase as well, and are theoretically unlimited (Arthur 1996).4 
Moreover, software is a so-called network product whose value increases when it becomes 
more widespread and established. As a result of the greater expected degree of compatibility 
and interoperability with other users, a potential costumer is likely to choose the predominant 
product. This tendency is called the network effect (Shapiro and Varian 1999). Given the 
potential for increasing returns and the impact of network effects, an already successful 
software company can be expected to dominate its market segment because of an ever-
increasing advantage over its competitors in revenue and profits. That is why software 
companies must grow as quickly as possible in order to become the dominant player in their 
                                                 
4 This does not imply that a product has to be marketable without any customization and further human 
interaction. If a software product with high implementation and customization complexity is distributed and 
implemented by a third party this will not negatively influence the cost structure of the software producer itself. 
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field of activity. In a winner-takes-all industry, the entrepreneurial company is thought to be 
the one best way to sustained profit, employment, and shareholder value generation (Lewis 
1999). According to the EBM concept the combination of VC and growth market segments is 
most able to provide entrepreneurial companies with the necessary financial resources. 
Here it becomes clear that the term EBM refers not only to the companies themselves but also 
to a collection of supportive institutions and actors. Entrepreneurs, abundant VC, liquid 
growth segments on the national stock market, specialized investment banks, and a vibrant 
investor community are the main elements of the infrastructure facilitating and supporting 
entrepreneurial companies (Lee, Miller et al. 2000). The next section concentrates on the main 
institutional pillars of EBMs: stock markets and venture capital. 
 
Venture Capital and Stock Markets 
The term VC denotes equity capital that specializes in providing finance to companies which 
are unable to rely on internal revenue or traditional lower cost sources of capital such as bank 
loans. Since considerable amounts of basic R&D are funded by larger corporations or 
governments, many of the entrepreneurs come from existing companies or universities where 
they acquired the competencies and developed the initial idea for a start-up company. The 
entrepreneurial personality prefers the risk and potential reward of a start-up to the greater 
certainties of a career in the corporate world or at a university. Frequently, all that these 
entrepreneurs lack is the capital and the management techniques needed to transform a 
technology start-up into a successfully growing company. VCs specialize in the provision of 
both financial resources and management assistance. Thus, the entrepreneur and his or her 
shortcomings are the first important link between the EBM and VC (Zider 1998). 
The second important link between the two concepts is the technology start-up’s need for 
working capital. The typical entrepreneurial company is founded to specifically develop a 
highly innovative product with a large potential market. Due to a lack of collateral or of a 
extended history of profitability, these new and, in many cases, loss-making companies are 
dependent on outside funding to finance the initial research and development expenses, the 
production, marketing, and distribution investments which are necessary to prepare the 
company for a floatation on the stock market. Most VC investments, in Germany and 
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elsewhere, concentrate on so called expansion and bridge financing (Schertler 2000).5 Much 
of the growth of these companies – and much of the value for the shareholders – comes after 
listing on the stock market. The venture capitalist prepares a company to tap the finance that 
is provided by the investors on the stock market. Normally, the venture capitalist sells the 
shares of a portfolio company after a group of investment banks helped it go public (i.e. sell 
its shares to the general investing public). In the concept of the EBM, the task of VC is to 
screen the business models and management teams of start-ups for viability, competency, and 
growth potential. Ideal typical venture capitalists seek to increase the probability of picking 
the right companies through intensive industry specialization and networking (Schertler and 
Stolpe 2000). 
Finally, a liquid and receptive stock market is the single most important requirement for the 
VC investment calculus described above. The most lucrative exit channel for VC investments 
is the IPO. Trade sales (i.e. sales to other companies) and management buybacks are generally 
regarded as far less profitable. VC needs an active and risk-tolerant stock market to maximize 
business profitability and provide its portfolio companies with the finance required.6 Investors 
in turn see VC-backed companies as having higher quality than other companies going public. 
This is because venture capitalists need to safeguard their reputation in order to secure 
investors to finance and investment banks to make deals with their portfolio companies in the 
future (Gompers and Lerner 1996). In this sense, not only is a liquid stock market for high-
growth business models essential for the existence of an active venture capital market, but 
also the other way around. It would be much more costly for investors to assess the prospects 
of companies attempting an IPO without VC as a guarantor for a certain minimum level of 
quality of the company. 
VC and growth stock markets or market segments are considered to be the principal 
prerequisites of a ‘Silicon Valley’ type of industry evolution, particularly in the German 
discussion of high-tech startups (Seitz 1990; Audretsch 1995; Partner 1998; Knips 2000). The 
rationale behind this point of view is that German industry and research institutes were in fact 
innovative, but were often unable to successfully commercialize their innovations. According 
                                                 
5 The seed and start-up stages are the stages in which VC investment would support the R&D phase of a new 
product. Expansion financing in essence prepares a company for the stock market in terms of scaling up 
operations. Bridge financing is mainly a financial investment which increases a company’s equity to a level 
adequate for the stock market, and to cover the expenses of the IPO. 
6 This so-called ‘pull’-thesis about the cyclical nature of VC activity is not unchallenged (Becker and Hellmann 
2002). Competing explanations include long-term social change and the emergence of a powerful 
transformational technology (‘push’-thesis) (Fiedler and Hellmann 2001). 
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to this view, the American example has shown that new companies which implement an EBM 
best commercialize radical innovations. Two very important and necessary preconditions of 
commercialization of new technologies through entrepreneurial companies are VC and a stock 
market which provides venture capitalists with an exit channel. 
 
Entrepreneurial vs. Traditional Business Models 
A typical example for an entrepreneurial company is Silicon Valley’s BEA Systems. The 
company, which developed from a venture capital-backed start-up founded in 1995 to a 
publicly listed, one billion dollar company in 2002, was able to define a whole new market 
segment – enterprise application integration. Software license revenues of BEA Systems 
account for approximately 50 percent of total turnover. License revenues are typically charged 
for a relatively standardized product which is sold in several copies, and not for tailor-made 
software for one customer. Operations which rely on a product mix characterized by a high 
percentage of software license revenues are likely to be scaled up easily. BEA Systems 
realized a compound annual growth rate of 34 percent between 1998 and 2002 and had a 
turnover of $934 million with a 12 percent return on sales in 2002. BEA System has gained 
considerable reputation for being the fastest growing software company ever, even outpacing 
Microsoft. The two aspects of BEA System’s business which are most important here are 
technological novelty and scalability. As described above, a successful software company has 
to grow as quickly as possible to dominate its respective market segment. A standardized 
distribution strategy and a market which is not yet consolidated (i.e. an immature market) are 
two important preconditions for that strategy to work. 
The prime example for a traditional company of German origin is Bechtle AG. The company 
was founded in 1982 (13 years earlier than BEA Systems) and achieved a compound average 
growth rate of 42 percent between 1998 and 2002. The company’s turnover was €751 million 
in 2002 with a 2.5 percent return on sales (the figures for BEA Systems are 34 percent 
compound average growth rate, $934 million turnover and 12 percent return on sales). 
Characteristically for the German software sector, Bechtle AG is an IT-service company with 
a broad product portfolio and with only a very tiny fraction of its yearly turnover generated 
through the sale of reusable software developed in-house.  
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Table 1 gives a stylized summary of the two types of business models as described above. 
Profitability, growth, age, financing patterns, and corporate governance are variables which 
are relatively easy to measure.7 Numeric indicators of innovativeness and product 
standardization are more difficult to develop. In this paper four analytical categories are 
therefore used to measure these characteristics of a company’s product and marketing 
strategies.  
 
Table 1: Stylized Business Models: Entrepreneurial vs. Traditional 
 
 Entrepreneurial (USA) 
 
Traditional (Germany) 
 
Innovation Radical innovation, deviating from 
existing competencies and 
technologies. 
 
Incremental innovation, securing 
employees’ and customers’ 
investments. 
 
Standardization High. Operations and production are 
easy to scale. 
 
Low. A high proportion of costs are 
variable (labor, etc.). 
 
Profitability Loss making in the R&D stage. 
Highly profitable once consolidated. 
 
Moderate profitability throughout the 
entire business history. 
 
Growth Offensive growth orientation. 
 
Defensive growth orientation. 
 
Age at IPO Young 
 
Mature 
 
Finance Risk-tolerant equity. Share issues and 
bond markets. 
 
Risk-averse debt. Bank and government 
loans. 
 
Corporate 
Governance 
Outsider dominated: Venture 
capitalists, institutional investors. 
Investment protection via reporting. 
 
Insider dominated. Senior management. 
Investment protection via collateral. 
 
 
When differentiating between general software and services, business software, specialized 
software, and Internet software, one obtains a rough separation and ranking of the companies 
according to the technological novelty of their products as well as the general degree of 
product standardization in descending order (see Table 2) 8 
                                                 
7 Profitability, growth, and age are measures easily calculated with the information provided by annual reports. 
Entrepreneurial financing patterns and corporate governance structures are indicated through the presence of 
early-stage VC as shareholder and board member as publicized in the IPO prospectus of a company. 
8 The difference in product standardization between the first two groups as a whole and the latter two groups as a 
whole is the most pronounced. The differences between group 1 and group 2 and between group 3 and group 4 
are not as large. 
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Table 2: Four Categories of Software Companies 
 
Group 1: General Software and Services Project software, implementation, IT-
services. 
 
Group 2: Business Software Enterprise resource planning software, 
customer relationship software, human 
resources management software, financial 
software. 
 
Group 3: Specialized Software Document management system, computer 
aided design and manufacturing, 
middleware, network infrastructure software. 
 
Group 4: Internet Software E-commerce software, security software, 
Internet infrastructure software, web services 
and application integration software. 
 
 
The following sections present an empirical investigation into the structure and performance 
of ‘Neuer Markt’ software companies and VC based on these concepts. 
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Business Models and Venture Capital Participation on the ‘Neuer Markt’ 
 
To recapitulate, the first issue this paper is concerned with is the implementation of EBMs in 
Germany and the economic development of those companies. The second question is the role 
VC played for the development of the companies which underwent an IPO on the ‘Neuer 
Markt’. The main concern here is the degree to which German VC could realize its intended 
potential role. In this section the model developed in the theoretical part of the paper (see 
table 1) is used to screen the population of former ‘Neuer Markt’ software companies for the 
existence of entrepreneurial companies. In order to asses the success of an industry group and 
its characteristic business model the groups are compared with each other, rather than with an 
external benchmark such as BEA Systems or some theoretically chosen quantity. In particular 
the differences between industry group 1, the most traditional group, and group 4, the most 
entrepreneurial group, are of interest for this paper. Furthermore, the paper is concerned with 
the degree to which the groups correspond with the framework laid out in table 1 when 
compared with each other. Which group is growing fastest, which is more profitable, and 
which had VC as an investor most frequently? Thus the paper tries to measure the extent of 
the existence of and performance of entrepreneurial companies in the German context. 
 
Business Models of German Software Companies 
A total of 105 software companies and IT-service companies conducted an IPO on the ‘Neuer 
Markt’ between 1997 and 2002. To date, 79 of these 105 companies survived as independent 
entities on the succeeding segments of the ‘Neuer Markt’ at the Frankfurt stock exchange (see 
table 3). These remaining 79 companies are struggling with the severe crisis affecting most 
segments of the software sector. Only 24 of 79 were profitable in 2002. However, at the end 
of 2002, 69 of 79 companies had higher revenues than they did at the end of 1998. Given that 
these companies had been operating in a depressed market for almost two years at the end of 
fiscal year 2002, a mean yearly compound average growth rate of 24% between 1998 and the 
end of 2002 is not a poor performance.9 The development of employment at these companies 
yields a similar picture. Despite heavy lay-offs in the wake of the bursting of the Internet 
                                                 
9 This average excludes three outliers with compound annual average growth rates much larger than 100%.  
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bubble and the slump in demand for information technology between 1998 and 2002, net 
employment at ‘Neuer Markt’ software companies increased by 17,891 jobs.10 
 
Table 3: Status of Software Companies on the ‘Neuer Markt’, December 2003 
 
Current status Number Percentage 
In Operation 79 75% 
Declared bankrupt 18 17% 
Acquired 7 7% 
Liquidated 1 1% 
Total 105 100.0% 
Source: Own calculations based on press reports. 
 
However, none of the software companies from the ‘Neuer Markt’ were able to achieve 
success comparable to American software firms based on the EBM concept11. Compared to 
the well-known American examples (e.g. BEA Systems which was described above) the track 
records of many German companies are characterized by a different, more conservative 
pattern. In general, German companies are far behind in either size, in growth rates, or in 
profitability. By and large, the biggest and most successful companies offer a hybrid of semi-
customized software development for established markets and third party implementation 
services. Twelve of the twenty largest former ‘Neuer Markt’ companies are such IT-service 
firms which comprise group 1 (see table 4).  
                                                 
10 This figure excludes companies that have been acquired or which have filed for bankruptcy. 
11 Admittedly, not all American firms following the EBM model succeeded. Still, this model has served as the 
basis for many companies’ success.  
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Table 4: Distribution of Industry Group Membership by Sales Quartiles (2002) 
 
 Quartiles (descending) 
 First Second Third Fourth Total 
Group 1: 
General Software and Services 60 (12) 55 (11) 5 (1) 4 (1) 31 (25) 
Group 2: 
Business Software 15 (3) 10 (2) 25 (5) 24 (5) 19 (15) 
Group 3: 
Specialized Software 15 (3) 20 (4) 35 (7) 24 (5) 23 (19) 
Group 4: 
Internet Software 10 (2) 15(3) 35 (7) 48 (10) 27 (22) 
Total 
 
100 (20) 100 (20) 100 (20) 100 (21) 100 (81) 
* Relative frequency in percent of industry group members by quartiles of sales 2002. Absolute number in 
brackets. 
 
The proportion of sales generated by software licenses revenues, i.e. by standardized software 
products, is between 0 and 10 percent for group 1 companies. In this case a high percentage of 
company revenues are generated through staff intensive implementation and programming 
services. Economies of scale are not very important in these types of services. The closest 
German match for a company like BEA Systems (a company which would fit into group 4) in 
terms of size and economic success is the above described Bechtle AG, which is a 
paradigmatic member of industry group 1.  
On average the companies of group 1 are the most successful in terms of size and profitability 
(see table 5).12 This group has the lowest bankruptcy rate (7%) of all the groups between 1997 
and now. The advanced age, the established product and service portfolios, the low degree of 
product standardization, and the low growth rate (as compared to group 4, see below) 
identifies companies in group 1 as traditional in the sense of the classification in table 1. This 
conclusion is supported by the fact that early-stage and expansion VC played a minor role for 
the companies of group 1 (see table 9, page 19). For the remainder of this paper group 1 will 
serve as a benchmark to asses the relative performance and structural features of other 
industry groups. 
                                                 
12 Table 6 provides the same measurements as Table 5 ‘normalizing’ the data for the respective company’s year 
of IPO. This gives an impression of the companies’ economic development taking into account their different 
positions in the capital market cycle. Here, this rearrangement does not lead to major differences in the group 
characteristics. 
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Table 5: Properties of Software Companies on the ‘Neuer Markt’ in 2002 (mean, median, and 
standard deviation) 
 
  
General Software 
and Service 
(n~25) * 
Business 
Software (n~15) 
Specialized 
Software (n~19) 
Internet Software 
(n~22) 
Sales (Mio. Euro) 
mean 
median
sd 
141.5 
72.1 
157.0 
43.0 
23.3 
44.9 
41.6 
22.3 
40.6 
34.1 
19.9 
50.7 
Return on sales (%) 
mean 
median
sd 
-10.3 
-5.7 
19.4 
-13.8 
-7.7 
22.9 
-55.3 
-15.5 
121.9 
-41.1 
-32.5 
97.6 
4 year compound 
annual growth rate 
of sales (%) º 
mean 
median
sd 
28 
24 
25 
26 
21 
16 
12 
14 
17 
64 
48 
70 
Age at IPO (years) 
mean 
median
sd 
16.7 
14.5 
10.5 
20.6 
21.0 
7.0 
16.1 
16.0 
6.5 
12.2 
9.0 
8.0 
º 98 to 02 average compound growth rate. 
* The number of companies used for the calculations of different cells varies due to different availability of company information 
 
 
Table 6: Properties of Software Companies on the ‘Neuer Markt’ Two Years after their IPO 
(mean, median, and standard deviation) 
 
 
 General Software 
and Service 
(n~26) * 
Business 
Software (n~18) 
Specialized 
Software (n~23) 
Internet Software
(n~24) 
Sales (Mio. Euro) 
mean 
median 
sd 
152.4 
107.7 
154.5 
44.4 
23.9 
42.9 
44.3 
25.5 
37.8 
39.45 
20.4 
48.1 
Return on sales (%) 
mean 
median 
sd 
-12.2 
-0.6 
34.4 
-28.9 
-27.7 
38.9 
-53.7 
-18.1 
103.4 
-88.1 
-32.9 
123.9 
3 year compound 
annual growth rate of 
sales (%) º 
mean 
median 
sd 
44 
36 
33 
31 
26 
29 
15 
16 
24 
74 
64 
76 
3 year compound 
annual growth rate of 
productivity (%) º 
mean 
median 
sd 
-65 
-73 
21 
-75 
-76 
12 
-79 
-80 
10 
-78 
-78 
11 
º 1 year before IPO to 2 years after IPO average compound growth rate. 
* The number of companies which was used for the calculations of different cells varies due to different availability of company 
information 
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Group 2 to a large extent consists of the old guard of German middle-sized ERP13 - and 
financial software companies. Group 2 is the group with the second highest bankruptcy rate 
(22%). In particular the fates of Bäurer AG and Brain International AG demonstrate how the 
proceeds of an IPO can negatively affect a company. Both companies implemented a business 
model which is typical for group 2. Extensive industry specialization, hence a well-defined 
market-niche, and an implementation-intensive product architecture result in operations which 
neither scale up nor can be transplanted easily. Unable to grow internally and equally 
unprepared to integrate new acquisitions, both companies broke down when the acquired 
companies started to make losses at the start of the software industry’s crisis in 2000. Other 
companies (e.g. SoftM AG, Infor AG, and FJA AG) successfully managed to avoid such 
pitfalls. Many of them, though, are likely to be taken over by a larger player in the course of 
the consolidation of the enterprise resource planning software sector. None of these 
companies managed to grow large enough to represent a power in the ERP software segment. 
However, the 'Neuer Markt' was able to provide the companies of group 1 and group 2 with 
financial resources which many of them were able to exploit successfully. The average 
compound growth rates of sales within these two groups are relatively high. Many of these 
companies managed to increase their revenues in absolute terms and were able to modernize 
their product range to a considerable extent. 
The group of specialized software vendors (group 3) consists of companies which produce a 
variety of software. Their business models on average are technologically less established 
than those in group 1 and group 2, but are not as ‘cutting-edge’ as those in group 4. The group 
is more or less a catch-all for the companies which do not clearly belong to one of the other 
groups. Nevertheless, group 3 companies have a relatively standardized product in common, 
which in most cases is only applicable to a relatively small market. With some exceptions 
these companies could not use the proceeds of their IPOs to broaden their product portfolio 
sufficiently. As a result, 31% of this group’s companies had to declare bankruptcy, i.e. the 
highest bankruptcy rate of all groups. On average the group is the least profitable and the 
slowest growing of the four industry groups. 
A fourth group consists of companies which specialized in the Internet, e-commerce, security 
or application integration market as defined in table 2 (group 4). Table 5 shows that this group 
was younger at the time of IPO and grew faster than the companies in the other three groups. 
                                                 
13 Enterprise Resource Planning Software. The most famous ERP Company in Germany is SAP which never was 
listed on the ‘Neue Markt’. 
 15
In terms of revenues, however, it is still the smallest and least profitable group. Though, the 
bankruptcy rate of group 4 is still relatively low (at 15% it is the second lowest rate of all four 
groups) this rate can be expected to increase in the near future.  
The fate of the former e-commerce star Intershop AG, founded in 1992, can be regarded as 
symptomatic of group 4. After impressive successes in its first two years on the stock market, 
the company reached a peak turnover of €123 million, up from €17 million in 1998 (the year 
of floatation). In 2002 turnover plunged to €40 million. The medium-term survival of the 
company is insecure.  
According to the definition of an entrepreneurial company as laid out in table 1, one would 
expect to find entrepreneurial companies in group 4. E-commerce software, security software, 
Internet infrastructure software, web services and application integration software represented 
the latest technological developments in software in the mid to late 90s. In comparison with 
the other industry groups the average product standardization of group 4 companies is higher. 
The software produced by these companies represents general purpose technologies with a 
much larger potential market than the software produced by the other three groups. These two 
factors indicate a high standardization potential, which along with technological novelty is 
another important element of the EBM concept. Their low age and high growth performance 
in comparison with the other industry groups are in line with the notion of an entrepreneurial 
company. The more frequent presence of early-stage and expansion VC and the higher 
participation of venture capitalists on company boards is another point that could mark the 
emergence of EBMs on the ‘Neuer Markt’ (see table 9, page 19).  
However, one would expect virtually every member of group 4 to be founded with the 
participation of VC if the concept of EBMs would have already been deeply rooted 1997 
when the ‘Neuer Markt’ came into existence. The lack of profitability and the relatively low 
size of the group in terms of sales are further points which do not support the conclusion that 
group 4 membership is an indicator for the successful implementation of EBMs amongst the 
software companies on the ‘Neuer Markt’.  
Table 7 provides a comparison between group 1 and group 4 regarding the degree of 
correspondence between expected values based on the stylized business models of table 1 and 
actual empirical characteristics of the groups as provided in tables 5, 6, and 9. Again, it is 
important to note that this is based on a comparison of the two extreme groups with each other 
and not to an abstract model or an ideal typical American success story. 
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 Table 7: Correspondence of Expected and Actual Values for Generalist and Internet Software 
Companies (Groups 1 and 4)  
 
 Group 1:  
General software and services and 
group correspondence with stylized 
traditional business model 
 
Group 4: 
Internet software and group 
correspondence with stylized EBM 
 
Innovation High High 
Standardization High High 
Profitability Low Low 
Growth High High 
Age at IPO High High 
Finance High Medium 
Corporate 
Governance 
High Medium 
 
The description of the sample above shows that some German software companies on the 
'Neuer Markt' have product market specialization characteristic of EBMs (group 4). Tables 6 
and 7, however, suggest that, on the whole, companies with traditional products do better than 
those with radically innovative products. With regard to performance, the only notable 
difference between group 4 and the other groups is a higher growth rate. This, however, could 
be attributed to the lower initial revenue level of these companies (i.e. lower starting point) or 
their younger age, rather than successful expansion in a new business segment. Besides, these 
higher growth rates have not led to any company examples of major corporate success, 
industry domination, or employment creation. The best performing groups are the generalists 
and the enterprise software companies, both of which have a very specialized, industry-
specific, and service-intensive product portfolio. The less standardized a software product is, 
the more suited it appears to be for the business model of a German software company. This 
presumption is also supported by a negative correlation for the 'Neuer Markt' software 
companies between the standardization of the software product sold on the one hand and size 
and profitability on the other hand (see table 8). This is a counterintuitive finding given that 
the more standardized a software product is, the less costly it should be to scale up and the 
easier it should theoretically be for a company to grow. 
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Table 8: Correlation Coefficients of Sales, Return on Sales, and Software License Revenues 
as Percentage of Sales (n = 45) 
 
 Sales Return on sales Lic. rev. as % sales 
Sales 
 1 -- -- 
Return on sales 0.12 (0.26) 1 -- 
License revenue as % 
sales 
-0.26 
(0.05) 
-0.29 
(0.07) 1 
Figure in parenthesis is level of significance. 
Return on sales = (EBT/sales) 2001. 
License Information = mean(sum(1998 to 2000)). 
 
To sum up, it cannot be clearly concluded that typical EBMs (as defined in the theoretical part 
of this paper) can be found amongst the software companies on the ‘Neuer Markt’. A group of 
companies have been identified which display certain properties associated with the concept 
of EBMs (group 4 companies). These companies are by no means the dominant group in our 
sample in terms of number or performance, as one would expect in the case of a growth 
segment like the ‘Neuer Markt’. None of the companies was able to achieve a dominant or 
standard setting position in its target market. Furthermore, many companies were identified 
which one would not expect to find on a growth segment due to the static character of their 
business model and their resulting inability to grow rapidly. Nevertheless, many of those 
companies seemed to be able to capitalize on the proceeds they collected during their IPOs. 
Whereas the ‘Neuer Markt’ thus leaves a mixed impression as far as the fate of its software 
companies is concerned, it certainly did not excel as a growth segment by attracting 
successful entrepreneurial high-tech companies in large numbers. Only some elements of 
EBMs can be observed to a limited extent, such as a comparably high percentage of early-
stage and expansion VC participation or the product specialization of group 4 companies. 
 
Venture Capital and German Software Companies 
The second aim of this paper is to describe and analyze the role VC capital played for 
software companies on the ‘Neuer Markt’. Did VC investment concentrate on the Internet 
software companies of group 4 (as the concept of EBMs would suggest), or did VC operating 
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on the ‘Neuer Markt’ develop original strategies tailored to the companies it has to work with 
in the German context? On a descriptive level, the information provided in table 9 answers the 
first question in the negative. VC investment appears to be evenly distributed between the 
traditional and the high-tech groups. A chi-square test fails to reject the hypothesis that the 
distribution of VC presence is independent of industry membership. This picture does not 
change when one narrows down the stage of VC investment to just early stage and expansion 
investment.14 This does not lead to a noticeable concentration in any of the sectors. There is 
also no significant clustering when looking at board membership of the venture capitalist, 
which would be an indicator of substantial involvement. The percentage of shares owned by 
the venture capitalists at the time of IPO is also independently distributed. 
 
Table 9: Cross-tabulation of Four Industry Groups on Different Indicators of Venture Capital 
Involvement 
 
 
General 
Software 
and 
Services 
(N=30)  
 
Business 
Software 
 
 
(N=29) 
 
Specialized 
Software 
 
 
(N=19) 
 
Internet 
Software 
 
 
(N=27) 
 
VC investment presentº 23% 13% 52% 37% 
VC has a member on the company's boardº 10% 10% 15% 18% 
Early stage or expansion (no bridge)º 6% 3% 21% 22% 
Average % of shares hold by VC (at IPO)* 7.2% 3.1% 7.3% 9.7% 
ºPearson chi2 is not significant. 
*Mann-Whitney rank sum test not significant for any group. 
 
The second question concerning VC – whether a typical German variety of VC came into 
existence at the ‘Neuer Markt’ – will be addressed in the next section. Different factors 
potentially influencing the growth and performance of the companies are examined in a 
regression analysis. The influence of VC and membership in one of the four industry groups 
on company performance will be tested using alternative explanatory variables. Thus, a 
complementary and statistically more refined perspective on entrepreneurial companies and 
VC investment in Germany is developed.  
                                                 
14 See footnote number 5 on page 7. 
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Venture Capital and/ or Industry Membership as Determinants of Performance 
 
In this section the determinants of company performance from an entrepreneurial perspective 
are analyzed in more detail through two regression models. Both models are estimated with an 
ordinary least square regression (OLS) using the natural logarithm of all continuous variables 
to correct for non-normal distribution. The dependent variables are compound average sales 
growth and compound average productivity growth for the period one year before to two 
years after the company's IPO. These variables describe two important dimensions of 
corporate performance on the one hand and two central elements of EBMs on the other. If 
EBMs were a successful strategy for German software companies, then companies with the 
most novel product market focus and the easiest to scale product strategy (i.e. the Internet 
software companies) should have the fastest sales and productivity growth. We would also 
expect VC to have a positive influence on both the sales and productivity growth of a 
company because of its ability to identify the most lucrative investments in the sense of 
promising growth candidates. The compound annual growth rates of sales and productivity 
reach from the first year before going public to the second year on the stock market.15 For the 
purposes of comparative analysis it seems reasonable to use a "time to IPO normalized" 
dataset, since the timing of going public has a significant influence of the operation of a 
company. Therefore, the time structure of the dataset is transformed to a metric based on time 
relative to the date of IPO rather than on the basis of the calendar year. 
The estimated models in mathematical notation are: 
εϕγωδτβα +++++++= ∑∑∑ LAGELSBITIPOIGVCIGVCLCGS iiiiii 1*  
with the natural logarithm of the average compound growth rate of sales (LCGS) as 
dependent variable and 
εγωδτβα ++++++= ∑∑∑ 1* LSBITIPOIGVCIGVCLCGP iiiiii  
with the natural logarithm of the average compound growth rate of productivity (LCGP) as 
dependent variable. VC is a dummy denoting the presence of venture capital, IG is a dummy 
                                                 
15 Here technical productivity is used: sales/ number of employees. 
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denoting the membership in one of the four industry groups, VC*IG are the interaction terms 
of VC and IG, TIPO is a dummy with three groups showing whether the IPO took place in 
1997-1998, 1999 or 2000-2001, LAGE is the natural logarithm of the age of a company at 
IPO, and LSBI1 is the natural logarithm of sales at the beginning of the period (one year 
before IPO) the compound growth rates have been calculated for. 
To test whether both dimensions of EBMs are present – i.e. the presence of VC in the Internet 
software group as fastest growing group (sales) with the easiest to scale business models 
(productivity) – we include industry group membership (IG), the presence of VC (VC) and 
the related interaction terms as dummy variables (VC*IG). The reference group for the 
industry dummies is group 1 (general service and software companies) which was identified 
as the predominant and most successful industry group in Germany. Hence, all statements 
about industry groups and VC involvement have to be understood in relation to this 
benchmark. The only issue concerning the type of VC which is important for this paper is 
bridge financing as opposed to early-stage and expansion financing.16 Here the paper will 
concentrate on any type of VC financing (early, expansion or bridge financing) as one group 
in comparison to companies with no VC participation at all. It is true that early-stage and 
expansion venture capital involvement requires a much higher degree of industry 
specialization and an entirely different set of management competencies on the part of the VC 
firm. The VC complex as whole, however, can be understood as a gatekeeper to financial 
markets. Thus, this paper concentrates on the performance of VC in general and not of 
specific subgroups. 
As far as the representation of EBMs and the strategies of VC are concerned the regression 
could generate six meaningful scenarios in both cases. Each would represent a different 
configuration of industry success and VC involvement in Germany. 
1. A positive and significant interaction term between the Internet software group and the 
presence of VC could be interpreted as the presence of companies with successfully 
implemented EBMs that perform better than group 1 companies that received venture 
financing. 
2. A positive and significant interaction term between any other industry groups and the 
presence of VC could be interpreted as a German variant of VC specialization in 
companies that are technologically less advanced than group 4 members but which 
                                                 
16 See footnote number 5 on page 7. 
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still successfully outperform VC investment in the traditional generalist companies of 
group 1. 
3. A positive and significant VC involvement variable alone (i.e. without any of the 
interaction terms being significant) would indicate an ability of German VC to screen 
potential growth candidates successfully without adopting a specific industry focus. 
4. A positive and significant result for only one of the industry groups would imply an 
advantage of one of the industry sectors over the generalist companies and no specific 
influence of VC. 
5. The general absence of significant relationships between performance and industry 
group or VC variables would indicate weak VC and the absence of a best performing 
industry group in Germany.  
6. A significant negative relationship between any industry group variable or the 
interaction term of industry group and VC would indicate a general better performance 
of the generalist company (group 1) or the higher capacity of German VC to promote 
the development of the generalist companies. 
 
Determinants of Sales Growth 
For the regression on sales growth three additional variables were included as controls: the 
age of the company when it underwent the IPO (LAGE), the size of the company expressed as 
the sales figure one year before the IPO (LSBI1)17, and the time proximity of a company’s 
IPO to the bursting of the Internet bubble and the subsequent industry crisis through a dummy 
variable (TIPO). The dummy divides the sample into three groups: One group that floated in 
1997 or 1998, one group that floated in 1999 and a final group that floated in 2000 or 2001. 
All continuous variables in the model are logarithmic to correct for non-normal distribution. 
Table 10 presents the estimation results for the first equation. The coefficients of age and size 
behave exactly as described in much of the literature. The older and the bigger a company is, 
the slower it grows. Not surprisingly, another influential factor is the timing of the company’s 
IPO. The closer the IPO is to the peak of the software industry crisis in the year 2000, the 
                                                 
17 For more detailed information and references on age, size, and sector membership as predictors for sales 
growth and about size and sector membership as predictors for productivity growth see (Whittington 1980; 
Dunne and Hughes 1994; Geroski, Machin et al. 1997; Söderbom and Teal 2001). 
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greater the negative influence on the growth performance is in comparison to the years 1997 
and 1998. 
Two of the industry variables as well as the variables measuring VC participation in general 
and VC participation in different industry groups do not have a significant influence on the 
compound annual growth rate of sales. Companies belonging to the Internet software group 
do not grow significantly faster than generalist companies with more traditional product 
portfolios. An exception is the third industry group (specialized software). The coefficient is 
negative and significant. This corresponds with the account given in the above analysis of the 
different industry groups’ structure. 
To sum up, it can be said that fundamental traits of the companies, such as age and growth, 
and the industry business cycle help explain differences in growth performance. Industry 
group membership or VC involvement have no significant influence. The empirical results do 
not provide any support for the existence of successful entrepreneurial companies in the 
Germany software sector. The relevant industry group (Internet software) does not perform 
significantly better in terms of sales growth than more traditional ones. Likewise, there is no 
evidence that VC was able to support the implementation of EBMs in the context of the 
‘Neuer Markt’, or that a German variant of VC successfully emerged.18 
 
                                                 
18 The picture did not change when narrowing down the definition of VC in the regression model to early-stage 
and expansion financing. 
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Table 10: Determinants of Compound Annual Sales Growth 
 
Log of compound average 
growth rate of sales 
 (1 year before IPO to 2 years after) 
 
 
coefficient 
(se) 
VC yes/ no (dummy) 
 
-0.17 
(0.16) 
Industry group 2 (dummy) 
 
-0.13 
(0.08) 
Industry group 3 (dummy) 
 
-0.27*** 
(0.09) 
Industry group 4 (dummy) 
 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
Interaction group 2 x VC 
 
 0.14 
(0.19) 
Interaction group 3 x VC 
 
 0.21 
(0.20) 
Interaction group 4 x VC 
 
 0.13 
(0.17) 
IPO in 1999 (dummy) 
 
-0.25*** 
(0.09) 
IPO in 2000 and 2001 (dummy) 
 
-0.35*** 
(0.09) 
Log of sales one year before IPO 
 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
Log of age 
 
-0.13*** 
(0.05) 
Constant 
 
 1.04*** 
(0.15) 
  
Adjusted R²  0.48 
 
N  79 
 
Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent 
(***) levels. 
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Determinants of Productivity Growth 
For the regression on productivity growth only the initial size of the company and the 
dummies for the years of the IPO are used as controls.19 A somewhat different and less clear 
picture emerges (see table 11). The OLS regression yields significant negative estimates for 
the three industry group dummies, implying that all three groups perform significantly worse 
than group 1 as far as productivity growth is concerned. This finding is consistent with the 
negative correlation between product standardization on the one hand and size and 
profitability on the other reported above (table 8). Furthermore, there is a positive and barely 
significant relation between the interaction term of VC and the third industry group. VC, VC 
in group 2 and group 4, as well as the timing of the IPO have no significant influence on 
productivity growth. 
The regression results do not provide any strong evidence supportive of the position that VC 
makes a positive contribution to productivity growth in the German software industry. In 
addition, there is no sign that the more standardized and novel companies perform better than 
the traditional generalist companies of group 1. This fact is especially striking in the case of 
productivity growth as the generalist companies have operations that should theoretically be 
the most expensive to scale. There is evidence that VC presence in group 3 companies 
positively influences the productivity development of companies in this group compared to 
companies of group 1. Still, this is the only instance in which the presence of VC has a 
positive effect and it would be difficult to draw the conclusion that there is a systematic 
positive influence of VC on growth performance in general. 
In general the regression on productivity growth suggests a structural disadvantage of 
companies specializing in segments with standardized products. One of the main assumptions 
of the concept of EBMs, the superiority of easy-to-scale production and distribution 
strategies, seems not to hold in the case of the German software companies listed on the 
‘Neuer Markt’. The customization strategies of the generalist companies in group 1 allow 
those companies to grow as fast as the more specialized companies do (see regression 1) and 
seem to be better suited to adjust to an industry crisis than the more specialized and 
standardized strategies. 
                                                 
19 Age is normally not used as predictor of company productivity (Söderbom and Teal 2001). Therefore it was 
not includes as control in the second regression. 
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Table 11: Determinants of Productivity Growth  
 
Log of compound average 
growth rate of productivity 
 (1 year before IPO to 2 years after) 
 
 
coefficient 
(se) 
VC yes/ no (dummy) 
 
-0.17 
(0.19) 
Industry group 2 (dummy) 
 
-0.25** 
(0.10) 
Industry group 3 (dummy) 
 
-0.40*** 
(0.12) 
Industry group 4 (dummy) 
 
-0.23* 
(0.12) 
Interaction group 2 x VC 
 
 0.26 
(0.24) 
Interaction group 3 x VC 
 
 0.43* 
(0.25) 
Interaction group 4 x VC 
 
 0.13 
(0.21) 
IPO in 1999 (dummy) 
 
-0.05 
(0.13) 
IPO in 2000 and 2001 (dummy) 
 
-0.06 
(0.13) 
Log of sales one year before IPO 
 
 0.04 
(0.04) 
Constant 
 
-1.03*** 
(0.19) 
  
Adjusted R² 
 
 0.27 
N 
 
 75 
Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent 
(***) levels. 
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Lessons from the ‘Neuer Markt’ for Entrepreneurial Business Models in Germany 
 
The Companies 
It is obvious that only a few of the software companies floated on the ‘Neuer Markt’ had the 
potential to become paradigmatic 'blockbuster product' companies. A large proportion of the 
companies can be regarded as established niche market players with relatively focused 
competences and customer groups. For those companies, the ‘Neuer Markt’ was an additional 
source of funding that helped at a time when German banks started to cut back their 
traditional loan-making activities. For some however, the IPO proceeds turned out to be a 
double-edged sword. Those companies operating in clearly defined niche markets with 
specialized organizational structures designed for intensive customer relationships turned out 
to be incapable of utilizing the fresh money and meeting the strategic requirements associated 
with publicly raised equity. In particular the growth imperative of the ‘Neuer Markt’ posed an 
almost insurmountable challenge to the management of those companies, particularly on the 
verge of a severe industry crisis. 
On the other hand, we have observed that many software companies developed favorably 
after their IPO on the ‘Neuer Markt’. These companies do not represent EBMs in the ideal 
typical sense, but since they became listed on a stock market they clearly departed from the 
traditional business model as presented in table 1. Nevertheless, the paper has shown that the 
least standardized business models perform best in Germany. They managed to complete and 
modernize their product and service portfolios. They were able to grow to an unprecedented 
level without overstretching their integrative abilities. Arguably, their success would not have 
been possible without the equity raised through their IPOs. But still, we note that many of 
them do not have a promising future since their business models either have reached their 
natural limits or they are likely to be taken over in the near future in the course of further 
industry consolidation. The prime examples for this group of companies are the previously 
mentioned Bechtle AG or the surviving part of the old guard of German enterprise resource 
planning software – SoftM AG, Infor AG, and FJA AG. 
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Venture Capital and the Stock Market 
Whereas the track records of software companies on the ‘Neuer Markt’ do not imply a special 
ability of VC to identify outstanding growth candidates or a outstanding viability of 
entrepreneurial companies, it does demonstrate that the ‘Neuer Markt’ was able to provide 
some companies with the necessary funds to grow faster than was previously possible. 
Starting from the software companies which had an IPO on the ‘Neuer Markt’, the question is 
whether the lack of relationship between VC investment and the business model adopted is a 
typical phenomenon which should be regarded as an invariant feature of the German context. 
Did German VC fail? Is the German economy structurally unsuitable for EBMs due to a lack 
of supportive infrastructure, which could be changed through policy measures, or due to 
conservative market structures, which would be more difficult to change? Was the fate of the 
‘Neuer Markt’ just a story about unfortunate timing? 
The structure of VC involvement in IPOs on the ‘Neuer Markt’ is unfortunately not well 
suited to fully answer these questions. The market for VC was ultimately just another segment 
of the German economy’s financial system, although less regulated than stock markets or the 
market for credit. Hence, venture capitalists were an integrated part of strategic decision 
making on these markets. If private, and to a certain degree institutional investors shift their 
behavior from investing to day-trading, thereby turning the stock market into a variation of an 
unstable futures market (Willett and Alway 2000, p. 61-67), the investment behavior of 
private equity and VC is bound to change as well. This is exactly what happened in the case 
of the ‘Neuer Markt’. Thus the characteristics of companies supported by VC, as well as the 
patterns of observable financing strategies at the ‘Neuer Markt’, cannot readily be attributed 
to the German corporate and VC landscape. The special situation of the ‘Neuer Markt’ and its 
unfortunate collapse through overly speculative investments also plays a role here. Against 
this backdrop it would be informative to conduct a comparison with VC behavior on a foreign 
growth market where the institutional environment is theoretically more supportive of EBMs 
than in Germany. 
To conclude, it can be stated that neither VC nor the ‘Neuer Markt’ could facilitate the 
development of successful EBMs amongst German software companies. Early stage and 
expansion VC did not concentrate its investment on the ‘cutting-edge’ companies of the 
Internet software group. Additionally, these companies have not been able to outperform 
more traditional competitors. On the contrary, the two best performing groups comprise the 
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oldest and most established software companies of German industry, which have business 
models incompatible with the notion of EBMs. For the most part, German VC apparently 
failed to develop a mode of operation that enabled it to identify above average growth 
candidates or more profitable companies. 
One must be cautious about concluding that growth and innovation strategies relying on the 
elements of EBMs in a German context are impossible. There is still insufficient information 
and analysis on these questions. More research must be done to conclusively answer the 
question of whether a ‘German version’ of EBMs is possible and what it could look like. 
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